Can Democracy Survive in the Post-Factual Age?: A Return to the Lippmann-Dewey Debate About the Politics of News

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"I have started to write a longish article around the general idea that freedom of thought and speech present themselves in a new light and raise new problems because of the discovery that opinion can be manufactured." Walter Lippmann, 1920

"Democracy will come into its own, for democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion. It had its seer in Walt Whitman. It will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissoluble wedded to the art of full and moving communication." John Dewey, 1927

There is a long held and often repeated assumption within liberal pluralist theories of the press that modern democracy rests on the foundation of the informed citizen who makes decisions based on rational, objective criteria and that the news media are perhaps the most crucial source of this information. The citizen, the media, and democratic government are neatly stitched together in this civic trilogy. And it is this assumption that has been eroding as we appear to have moved into a post-factual age where the border between fact and fiction, news and entertainment, information and advertisements has increasingly blurred.

For a long time now this assumption has been challenged by liberal and critical theorists for underestimating the role of ideology in the production of news. This is, what might be called, the "bias" critique, although on rare occasions the critique goes beyond bias to consider the very epistemology of news objectivity. The "bias" critique, perhaps the most dominant form of news criticism during the last three-quarters of a century, holds out the hope that the errors of accuracy and factuality may still be corrected, saving both the press and the democratic process.

More recently the liberal assumption has been challenged by liberal and critical theorists for misunderstanding that the role of the news as an institution is much more than the provision of information. This is what we might call the "cultural" critique and has taken two forms. Critical theorists have focused on the concept of the public sphere, asking where and under what condition is public opinion formed? And liberal theorists have begun to ask, under the guise of the public journalism movement, what is the role
of news in the creation and maintenance of a democratic culture?

These are important challenges and important efforts to address what has been seen as the latest crisis of the press, a crisis of irrelevancy marked by declining readership, declining viewership, declining trust, and a decline even in a taste for the serious. Much has been written to substantiate the bias as well as the cultural critique of news and citizenship. However, the present monograph will argue that there is a connection between these challenges, as well as the original impetus to the traditional assumption of the informational role of the news, which has only been hinted at, a connection that links what is seen as a problem of bias or a problem of civic participation to what might be called an "epistemological politics"—that is, the politics of what we know and how we act as citizens is linked to the politics of how we know. This monograph will argue that this link can be usefully illustrated and its importance explored by returning to a unique moment in United States media history: a debate between social commentator and journalist Walter Lippmann and philosopher John Dewey.

This debate is not unfamiliar to those concerned with the interconnections of citizenship, media, and democracy. In fact this debate, significantly brought to the attention of communication scholars by James W. Carey in the early 1980s, has in the last few years achieved a remarkable celebrity even in the popular press. In large part this has been due to the work of Jay Rosen, director of the "Project on Public Life and the Press" at New York University. Rosen saw this dialog between Lippmann and Dewey as illustrative of the contemporary need for the press to see its role in activist terms, both serving to rekindle a vital public life and serve as an active member of that public life. Rosen's work has, in turn, been drawn on and popularized by James Fallows in his recent book Breaking the News.3

Of particular concern here is the reconstruction of the Lippmann-Dewey exchange as it emerges as the theoretical foundation for the public journalism movement. Carey was acutely interested in what this exchange revealed about the interconnection between epistemology and values, and this interest was carried forward by scholars such as Daniel Czitrom in his intellectual history of modern communication theory, and John Peters in his consideration of the intersection of theories of democracy and theories of communication.4 However, in the work of public journalism movement writers like Rosen and Fallows, the significance of the connection between epistemology and values, not to mention power and politics, has faded considerably.

Of crucial importance to Dewey's position in this exchange was his critique of science as an ideology and the connection of this critique to the meaning of democracy. Dewey was not simply calling for a more activist
press and public, but was at work unriddling, for the sake of democracy, one of the most pervasive new forms of power in modern society: science as a way of knowing and science as a new value system which claimed to be value-free.

A key challenge of this monograph, then, is to recover this critical dimension of the Lippmann-Dewey exchange in order to broaden the discussion as to what is the deeper nature of the current crisis of the press and how this crisis should be addressed. At the same time it is hoped that this work can help establish an intellectual bridge between the public journalism movement and the current interest among communication scholars in the more theoretically sophisticated and more critical idea of the public sphere, particularly as represented by the work of Jurgen Habermas.

The guiding question, in this historical revisitation, will be how did the turn to an information model of the news, some might say a “scientization” of the press, affect the role of public opinion in U.S. democracy and contribute to a redefinition of citizenship as well as democracy in America? Lippmann’s answer, which in many ways has turned out to be prophetic, was that America’s turn to liberalism and particularly to a scientific vision of liberalism would end up undermining all moral authority. As Lippmann more bluntly put it “Liberalism had burned down the barn to roast the pig.” Dewey’s answer expressed a greater hope for a democratic future. But this faith was not based on the ideals of liberalism as much as in an understanding of the living character of democracy as a process rather than an end and in an understanding that the creation of knowledge is a social process that must be visible and responsive to the collective will of the people.

The Lippmann-Dewey Debate

In the 1920s an obscure debate took place between Walter Lippmann and John Dewey at an extraordinary moment in U.S. history. Not only was the press experiencing a major credibility crisis in its role as a democratic institution, but significant doubts were being raised about the viability of democracy itself as a form of government.

Lippmann, in his twenties, was already a nationally prominent and influential journalist. Dewey, in his sixties, was considered one of America’s preeminent philosophers. The context for the debate was the growing despair about the future of democracy. President Woodrow Wilson’s work to secure what he thought were the conditions for a lasting peace after World War I had collapsed in the face of rising nationalism and international commercial interests. Efforts to establish democratic governments in Germany and Italy had been thwarted. The tremors of the Bolshevik revolution were still being felt across Europe and in the United States. The belief in the fundamentally irrational nature of humankind was spreading.

The depth of doubt over the future of democracy manifested itself not only in the halls of academia and on the editorial pages of major newspapers, but also in the nooks and crannies of everyday culture. For instance, an official, widely used 1928 United States Army Training Manual stated that democracy led to “mobocracy,” the rule of mobs, and that the democratic
attitude toward property was "communistic." Democracy, the manual concluded, led to "demagogism, license, agitation, discontent, anarchy." 

Against this backdrop, the debate came to focus on the meaning and role of the news and "the public" in a democratic society.

Lippmann, because of his grave doubts over the capacity of the average citizen to engage in rational self-government, advocated a turn to positivistic science, not just for journalism, but for the practice of democracy as a whole. For Lippmann, given the inevitable tendency of individuals to distort what they see, coupled with the basic irrationality of humankind, the only hope for democratic government was to reinvent it. This new, more "realistic" democracy would be tempered and guided by a form of knowledge which, Lippmann believed, rose above subjectivity and politics: science. The Pandora's Box of the relativity of truth would be carefully resealed and a line drawn, if not neatly then at least boldly, between fact and fiction.

For Dewey, the crisis of the individual subjectivity and the crisis of democracy were not to be solved by science alone. Science had its own problems. For Dewey, one of the great ironies of science was that after it had performed such an efficient job of shattering belief in a metaphysical truth, in absolute truths such as God or the spirit of history, it attempted to claim that position for itself. That is, the positivist notion of science made the ironic claim that its truth existed outside of the influence or control of human action. Yet positivism provided no basis for this claim. For Dewey scientific knowledge was human-made knowledge. To claim that science was the answer to the crisis of subjectivity and the crisis of democracy was not to solve either of those problems, but to avoid them or worse, hide them.

Dewey argued that democracy has suffered from the bureaucratization and impersonalization of industrial life and from the growing power of economic forces to secure their interests in government either directly through compulsion or threat or indirectly in the manipulation of public opinion. The answer to these problems, Dewey argued, is not to establish an intellectual aristocracy in the name of science — where the pretense is that they have access to a truth untainted by human interests. The answer, Dewey argued, is to work to revive the power of the public so that it can speak for itself and demand that its interests, the public's interests be discovered, heard, and followed.

The path for Dewey meant a direct confrontation with the interrelationship of science, the press, and democracy. The heart of this relationship, Dewey said, was communication. But by communication Dewey did not mean the machinery of communication, but the art of communication, the process by which citizens in a society came to understand the nature of their interdependence through a system of shared meaning. In terms of the press, the path for Dewey was a turn to what might be called public journalism, although the term public journalism as it is being used today contains much less than what Dewey was calling for.

For both Lippmann and Dewey, somehow the problem of epistemology, about how we come to know what we know, was connected both to communication and citizenship.
An Odd Debate

In many respects the debate between Lippmann and Dewey was unusual. Simply as a debate, it did not take the form we typically associate with debating. There was no face-to-face confrontation. No live coverage. In fact it was carried out over a period of years, mainly in the form of books and essays. And one might even wonder if Lippmann knew he was even part of the debate. Where Dewey, in his essays and book, felt compelled to answer directly Lippmann’s arguments, Lippmann never returned the courtesy.

As a rising political superstar, perhaps Lippmann believed he had bigger fish to fry. Dewey certainly was not a small fish. In his sixties as a professor at Columbia University, he was generally regarded as one of the preeminent American philosophers of the time. However, his influence on government and politics was no match for Lippmann’s. While Dewey had access to the editorial pages of the New York Times to express his opinions about the issues of the day, Lippmann dined with the presidents and occasionally wrote their speeches. Lippmann, it would seem, had more on his mind than Dewey.

Lippmann appeared less interested in achieving consistency in his philosophical and political positions than in influencing the movers and shakers with his vision. For Dewey, a long-time outsider, Lippmann was a mover and shaker, worthy of being addressed and valuable if he could be persuaded.

It was also an odd debate in that the two men had often stood on the same side of many political issues. They both had supported Woodrow Wilson’s reelection bid for the presidency and, unlike many progressives of the period, they both stood behind him when he led the country into war. During the war when efforts to censor any statements critical of the United States were being stepped up, both men actively protested such action. The two men were known for their faith in the scientific method as a useful tool for solving the problems of society as well as industry. They both supported the women’s movement and voting rights for women, but neither seemed to have thought much about the more profound implications of the women’s movement for political theory, particularly as it concerned the relationship between domestic and public life.

In fact, a good bit of Lippmann’s formative thinking about society was influenced by Dewey. When Lippmann, at the age of twenty-three, made his appearance on the national political scene with the 1913 publication of his first book *A Preface to Politics*, the thinking of Dewey, or at least Lippmann’s interpretation of Dewey, was a major part of the solution advanced by the book for the various ills of society. In this book, Lippmann managed to weave together some of Dewey’s thoughts on the role of science in social change, as well as William James celebration of what he called “experience,” Nietzsche’s affirmation of the will, H.G. Well’s utopianism, and Freud’s notion of the unconscious. The book also represented the opening salvo by Lippmann on the middle-class reform efforts of the progressive movement, favoring instead the “radical” idea of scientific management." Lippmann’s second book, *Drift and Mastery*, published in 1914, was also indebted to Dewey’s ideas concerning the scientific management of society, ideas which, as we will see,
may not have been interpreted quite as Dewey intended.

The two men began a personal working relationship in 1914 when Lippmann became the first editor of *The New Republic*, a national monthly magazine "of politics and arts." Dewey was enlisted as one of the many prestigious contributors to the magazine, a magazine that served as a vehicle for Lippmann to continue his ascent into national political prominence and provided Dewey with his first truly national forum to move outside of philosophy to serve as commentator on national politics.

Lippmann's esteem for Dewey was also visibly revealed in other ways. In a 1916 review of Dewey's book *Democracy and Education*, published in *The New Republic*, Lippmann wrote that the result of the book "is not information or propaganda but a book which is the mature wisdom of the finest and most important intellect devoted to the future of American civilization."  

During the war Lippmann was appointed to coordinate a team of specialists to advise President Wilson on the shape of the peace plan to be implemented at the war's end. Lippmann invited Dewey to head a special branch of the inquiry to be based in Moscow. The branch never materialized, but the invitation indicated Lippmann's continued high esteem for Dewey.

Following the war, faced with disruption and uncertainty at home and abroad, the contrasts between their ideas became more visible as they turned their attention to what must be done to rescue democratic government. Lippmann's blend of liberalism and elitism became more pronounced and Dewey's commitment to participatory democracy deepened.

**Lippmann: Public Opinion and Epistemology**

In 1922 Walter Lippmann published *Public Opinion*, called by communication historian James W. Carey the "founding book in American media studies." This was not the first book about the mass media, but the first to provide a serious analysis of the role of the mass media, which attempted to rigorously incorporate contemporary social, philosophical, and political theory. In this book Lippmann provided a sophisticated rationale for the development of the professional code of objectivity in journalism. In addition he argued for a "sweeping rejection of traditional theories of democracy and the role of the press."  

Lippmann began *Public Opinion* with a story about an island in the ocean where in 1914 there lived a few Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Germans. No telegraph cable reached the island and a supply boat only came every sixty days. Consequently when war broke out between the English, French, and Germans, it was nearly six weeks before the island residents heard the news. "For six strange weeks," Lippmann wrote, "they had acted as if they were friends, when in fact they had become enemies."  

With this story Lippmann made his opening point: an epistemological point. People do not directly know the world in which they live. They know it only as a picture in their heads, a "fiction" or representation they have made. The meaning of this, Lippmann said, is that between every person and his or her world stands a "pseudo-environment." When one takes action, it
is not in response to the "real" world, but to the pseudo-environment one has constructed. In this space, between the world as it is and the picture of the world in one's head, is a great opportunity for distortion and error.\textsuperscript{14}

"To traverse the world," Lippmann wrote, "men must have maps of the world. Their persistent difficulty is to secure maps on which their own need, or someone else's need, has not sketched in the coast of Bohemia."\textsuperscript{15} This, Lippmann argued, is the central problem facing those who advocate democratic government. How can rule by the people not degenerate into irrationality and power struggles between self-interested factions if all maps of the "real" world are inevitably flawed? The challenge to the student of public opinion, then, Lippmann said, is to serve in the capacity of a social analyst "studying how the larger political environment is conceived and how it can be conceived more successfully."\textsuperscript{16}

In the succeeding chapters of \textit{Public Opinion}, Lippmann attempts to explain why "the pictures inside so often mislead men in their dealings with the world outside," the implications of these misperceptions for the traditional democratic theory of public opinion, why the press cannot adequately address these misperceptions and finally what can be done to save representative government.

\textbf{Misleading Pictures}

Lippmann divided his analysis of why "the pictures in our heads" are so often misleading into external factors that limit a citizen's access to the facts and perceptual factors which transform the few facts that do reach him or her. Among the external factors limiting access to the facts are "the artificial censorship, the limitations of social contact, the comparatively meager time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs, the distortion arising because events have been compressed into very short messages, the difficulty of making a small vocabulary express a complicated world, and finally fear of facing those facts which would seem to threaten the established routines of men's lives."\textsuperscript{17}

The problem of perceptual factors considers how "a trickle of messages from the outside is affected by the stored up images, the preconceptions, and prejudices which interpret, fill them out, and in their turn powerfully direct the play of our attention, and our vision itself"\textsuperscript{18} Lippmann argued, quoting Dewey, that in each act of perception we are confronted with a scene which is like a baby's world, "one great, blooming, buzzing confusion."\textsuperscript{19} What we must do to make sense of this confusion is impose an order on the scene based on the categories of understanding which our culture and experience have provided for us.

"For the most part," Lippmann explained, "we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture."\textsuperscript{20}

Stereotypes are therefore inevitable in perception. They can serve as obstacles to active understanding and the appreciation of individual differ-

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ences if they are dogmatically applied with no willingness to make adjustments for discrepancies and circumstance. However they are also efficient means of making tentative sense of the world and of new situations if one is willing to “hold them lightly, to modify them gladly.”

In this double-edge portrait of the role of stereotypes Lippmann fore-shadowed two interrelated parts of his argument to come. The first part, posed as a question, is that given the inevitable confusion over the facts and the highly subjective way in which each individual comes to understand them, to picture them in their heads, how do people come to agreement on the meaning of the real world? In Lippmann’s words, “How in the language of democratic theory, do great numbers of people feeling each so privately about so abstract a picture, develop any common will?” The second is that there does exist a means for rationally, objectively revising the pictures in our heads to more and more closely approximate the “real” world.

Creating the Public: A Natural Endowment vs. Symbols

How is the common will to be formed from the mess of individual perceptions? Lippmann suggested there are two explanations, one derived from democratic theory, the other from observing democracy in action.

Lippmann noted how often public leaders claim to be speaking for the public, as if a public exists. The U.S. ambassador to England in 1921 claimed to speak for the whole of the American people as to why the United States joined in on the side of the English, and yet the American people were deeply divided about the meaning and necessity of the war. Even those who fought in the war had a multitude of individual reasons for doing so. Warren Harding, as the 1920 Republican candidate for the presidency, claimed to speak for all Republicans, but the Republican Party was deeply fractured and filled with contradictions. When citizens cast their votes for Harding, the reasons were diverse and not necessarily rational.

How could the ambassador to England claim to speak for all the people and how could Harding claim to speak for all Republicans? And why were these claims not contested?

The answer according to traditional democratic theory, Lippmann said, was that men are born with a “natural endowment” for self-government. Lippmann said one could quibble over who exactly these “men” were. Alexander Hamilton, for instance, thought they were the “landholders, merchants and men of the learned professions” while Thomas Jefferson “thought the political faculties were deposited by God in farmers and planters, and sometimes spoke as if they were found in all people.” However, in traditional democratic theory, no matter who was assumed to possess the natural endowment, in the exercise of that endowment, knowledge of the world was taken for granted.

Consequently, from the point of view of traditional democratic theory, the answer to the question, how is the common will formed, or put somewhat differently, how do the varied individual opinions come together to form a force called “public opinion,” the answer is mysterious. It just happens. It is as if some great force conveniently knits together this diversity into a

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common force leading the nation into war or electing Harding president.

The answer in practice, Lippmann said, is significantly different, as every successful politician has understood since the time of Aristotle. Public opinion does not rise up from the people. It is manufactured by leaders. The manufacture of consent, Lippmann wrote, “was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic because it is now based on analysis rather than rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting economic power.”

The technic is the use of symbols to forge an illusory but effective common will. It is illusory because it works not by truly finding the common ground that unites the unlimited diversity of self-interests, but instead provides a common symbol onto which each citizen can project his or her own needs and desires.

Symbols and Politics

Lippmann provides an analysis of the political use of symbols that anticipates some of the more sophisticated arguments about post-factual age politics to be addressed in this monograph. Interestingly, this less scientistic aspect of Lippmann’s work has been almost entirely neglected in traditional mass communication theory and political science. The power of symbols, Lippmann argued, rests in the irrational character of human emotions coupled with the ambiguity of symbols themselves. In terms of human emotions, Lippmann wrote, “There is no end of things which can arouse the emotion, and no end of things which can satisfy it.” The consequence is that emotions are transferable, both in terms of what stimulates them and what satisfies them. Lippmann wrote:

If, for example, one man dislikes the League [of Nations], another hates Mr. Wilson, and a third fears labor, you may be able to unite them all if you can find some symbol which is the antithesis of what they all hate. Suppose that symbol is Americanism. The first man may read it as meaning the preservation of American isolation, or as he may call it, independence; the second as the rejection of a politician who clashes with his idea of what an American president should be, the third as a call to resist revolution. The symbol in itself signifies literally no one thing in particular, but it can be associated with almost anything. And because of that it can become the common bond of common feelings, even though those feelings were originally attached to disparate ideas.

An effective symbol can mean many things to many people, generating the illusion of solidarity while at the same time deflecting rational analysis. Modern democracy is therefore less rule by the people than creating the illusion that the people rule. As Lippmann put it, “A leader or an interest that
can make itself master of the current symbols is master of the current situation."\textsuperscript{28}

**Unrealistic Expectations of the Press**

Given traditional democratic theory's belief in the mysterious, but natural endowment of citizens for self-government, Lippmann wrote, it is not surprising that little thought has been given to "the idea that men have to go forth and study the world in order to govern it."\textsuperscript{29} The existence of civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association, were assumed to guarantee the formation of wise public opinion. But if truth is not something that spontaneously springs to life or if obstacles stand in the way of finding the truth, then this is a dangerous assumption.

Lippmann argued that the truth about events and affairs outside of one's direct experience is not self-evident and that the "machinery for assembling information is technical and expensive," and yet the political science of the time had not come to "grasp with the problem of how to make the invisible world visible to the citizens of a modern state."\textsuperscript{30}

The task of informing the public, consequently, has been unthinkingly dropped at the feet of the press. The problem is, according to Lippmann, the press is ill prepared to perform this task. "It is too frail to carry the whole burden of popular sovereignty, to supply spontaneously the truth which democrats hoped was inborn."\textsuperscript{31}

Part of the problem is due to the nature of the public, part to the nature of news itself, and part to the organizational structure of the news. All three parts share an economic premise.

The public is to blame for its interest primarily in themselves and in their unwillingness to pay the true price of gathering quality information. The consequence of the public's self-interest is that editors serve up news that does little to contribute to the formation of rational, critically reflective public opinion. "The theory," Lippmann wrote, "is that if enough people see their own names in the paper often enough, can read about their weddings, funerals, sociables, foreign travels, lodge meetings, school prizes, their fiftieth birthdays, their sixtieth birthdays, their silver weddings, their outings and clambakes, they will make a reliable circulation."\textsuperscript{32}

The flip-side of this self-interest is that the public is unwilling to pay the true cost of news gathering, believing that a "free press" means that "newspapers are virtually given away."\textsuperscript{33} The consequence is that the only way readers will pay for the news is when a major part of the cost is hidden in advertising. Put somewhat differently, if readers are unwilling to pay the true cost of the news through the subscription price, the only way for the
commercial press to survive is to turn the readers “into circulation which can be sold to manufacturers and merchants.” The reader is seen more as a target for advertising than as a citizen in a democracy.

The outcome, that news serves the interests of advertisers and the reading public that buys the advertisers’ goods, should be of no surprise. It is the readers' collective fault, Lippmann stated. As a business practice this is all quite understandable. However, it is an uncomfortable situation if one wants to believe that the press makes up for the failings of traditional democratic theory in the creation of a rational common will.

The contradiction between news and advertising is played out in its most concentrated moment in the person of the news editor. “His enterprises,” Lippmann wrote, “depend upon indirect taxation levied by his advertisers upon his readers; the patronage of the advertisers depends on the editor’s skill in holding together an effective group of customers.” Consequently the news editor must mostly provide news that fits within the existing range of expectations and stereotypes of the reader, emphasizing local over national, so as not to lose circulation, the economic base of the organization.

But it is not just the public, Lippmann wrote, but the economics of advertising and circulation make the press ill prepared for the task of informing the public. More important, Lippmann argued, it is the nature of news itself. For Lippmann there is a significant difference between news and the truth. “The function of news is to signalize an event, the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them into relation with each other, and make pictures of reality on which men can act.” News then is not a “mirror of social conditions” but simply a report on some aspect of the ongoing stream of social existence that has made itself visible.

Judging which of the infinite events that make up this ongoing stream are newsworthy forces newspapers, as commercial organizations, into making decisions based as much on efficiency of selection in terms of time and effort as on the public importance of the event. Much of what is of public importance may not easily translate into an easily accessible and easily reportable event.

Perhaps the most significant indication of the extent of this problem is the existence of the press agent, Lippmann wrote, “The enormous discretion as to what facts and what impressions shall be reported is steadily convincing every organized group of people that whether it wishes to secure publicity or avoid it, the exercise of discretion cannot be left to the reporter.”

But to ask the press to address these limitations is to ask it to produce truth, not news. The detailed investigations that would be required “cost time, money, special talent and a lot of space,” resources which, Lippmann argued, are not available to the daily press.

While economic limitations impinge in numerous ways on the quality of the press, the most important limitation is not economic but the quality of information that is officially gathered and recorded. The news “is precise in proportion to the precision with which the event is recorded. Unless the
event is capable of being named, measured, given shape, made specific, it
either fails to take on the character of news, or it is subject to the accidents
and prejudices of observation.”^37

Lippmann concluded that the failure of traditional democratic theory to
take account of the problem of informing its citizens to allow them to engage
in rational self-government is leading to a dangerous state of affairs. “In the
absence of institutions and education by which the environment is so
successfully reported that the realities of public life stand out sharply against
self-interested opinion, the common interests very largely elude public
opinion entirely, and can be managed only be a specialized class whose
personal interests reach beyond the locality. This class is irresponsible, for
it acts upon information that is not common property, in situations that the
public at large does not conceive, and it can be held to account only on the
accomplished fact.”^38

**Toward a “Realistic” Theory of Democracy**

For Lippmann, the result of his analysis is that democracy is in danger
because we have overburdened it with false hopes about the capacity of the
average citizen to engage in self-rule. Even the hope that somehow the press
would or could provide the means to conjure up “a mystical force called
Public Opinion” is not workable.60

To save democracy requires the development of a “machinery of knowl-
edge” to overcome the “failure of self-governing people to transcend their
casual experience and their prejudice.”^40 What is needed, Lippmann argued,
is the development of a network of intelligence divisions supporting the
various agencies of government. These divisions would be staffed by social
scientists freed from the stifling confines of academia to take on the practical
problems of society.

The position of the social scientist would be radically changed:

Instead of being the man who generalizes from the facts dropped
to him by men of action, he becomes the man who prepares the
facts for men of action. This is a profound change of strategic
position. He no longer stands outside, chewing the cud provided
by busy men of affairs, but he takes his place in front of the
decision instead of behind it.41

Lippmann recognized that he was proposing a potentially new self-
interested faction be added to government and spent considerable time
sketching out some of the ways these intelligence divisions would operate
but also how checks and balances could be built into a system to keep this
new scientific aristocracy “neutral to their prejudice, and capable of over-
coming subjectivism.”^42

Nevertheless, Lippmann was developing a strong argument for the
redefinition of what would be called “democracy.” Power would be substan-
tially withdrawn from the hands of the ill-informed mass of citizens and
invested in the hands of a few “men of action,” public policy analysts and
political leaders.

Lippmann's justification for this shift of power was two-fold. First, traditional democratic theory asked too much of its citizens in becoming all-knowing, wise, and rational directors of government. Second, proponents of traditional democratic theory had mistaken the goal of democratic government. The true point of democracy, Lippmann argued, is not simply to allow individuals the pleasure of engaging in self-government. It is as much about his desire for the "good life." The point of democracy is not the process of government, not active citizenship, but the results of government. The purpose of the organization of intelligence divisions, "then, is not to burden every citizen with expert opinions on all questions, but to push that burden away from him toward the responsible administrator." This, in Lippmann's mind, was realistic democracy.

Lippmann was caught between two epistemological poles: truth as empirical, objective reality and truth as a construction of the mind. As much as his analysis revealed the inconsistencies of both positions, he finally felt he had to choose and he chose science, the science of Bacon, the science that believed a reality could be revealed untainted by human desire or interest. Lippmann came to a deep understanding of the politics of truth, but not to an understanding of the politics of science as truth. Lippmann's understanding of the symbolic dimension of politics was, in many respects, as sophisticated as much political semiotic work sixty years later. What Lippmann could not accept in the 1920s was that the authority of science might be as open to question as the authority of public opinion.

In August 1921, Lippmann dropped off the manuscript for Public Opinion with his publisher and left, with his wife, for an extended trip to Europe, part vacation and part a first-hand examination of the post-war status of the European nations. When he returned in January 1922, Lippmann assumed his new post as the chief editorial writer for the New York World.

Dewey: "The most effective indictment of democracy as currently conceived ever penned...."

When Public Opinion appeared in early 1922, the critics were impressed. The book was viewed as a significant breakthrough in the field of political science, revealing new and significant problems to be addressed and at the same time starkly challenging the possibility of democratic government in a modern society. At the same time the book, in many ways,
ushered in modern communication studies as a critical new field.

By 1922 Dewey shared Lippmann's more general pessimism about the possibilities for democratic government following the war as well as his specific concern for the growing manipulation of public opinion. Immediately after the war Dewey held out hope that the conflict had so weakened the existing order that there was an important opportunity to reconstruct a deeper and more meaningful form of democracy. However, this hope was quickly transformed into cynicism as the post-war reconstruction unfolded. Nationalistic strivings and economic self-interest quickly replaced any vestige of common mission that the war had generated.\(^4\)

In addition, the management of public opinion, such a prominent technique in this first modern war, now promised to become a matter of everyday life, not only for government but for commerce. The war had demonstrated the capacity for a new and dangerous alliance among powerful, elite interests in business, government, and the news. Their motto was, Dewey wrote, "Let us make democracy safe for the world by a careful editing and expurgation of the facts upon which it bases the opinions which in the end decide social action."\(^5\)

However, while Dewey shared Lippmann's concern for the current health of democracy, he did not necessarily share with him either the meaning or purpose of democracy. As early as 1892, Dewey had come to the conclusion that the class divisions brought about by industrial capitalism were contrary to the ethics of democracy.\(^6\) For Dewey democracy was not just a mechanical form of government, it was a recognition of the fundamentally social and interdependent nature of human existence. "What does democracy mean," Dewey asked, "save that the individual is to have a share in determining the conditions and aims of his own work; and that, upon the whole, through the free and harmonizing of different individuals, the work of the world is better done than when planned, arranged and directed by a few, no matter how wise or how good intent that few?"\(^7\)

In industrial capitalism, Dewey argued, the division of labor, the means by which individuals are assigned the work they will do, is far removed from the control or interest of the worker. The consequence is that "his activity is made a means to benefit others. It can't be complete till he does that for which he is best fitted—and in which he finds the most complete expression of himself."\(^8\)

According to Dewey, the core of democratic politics was the effort to create the conditions for individuals in a society to develop to their fullest potential. This, Dewey believed, was not possible where democratic action was restricted to the political sphere. "There is no need to beat about the bush in saying that democracy is not in reality what it is in name until it is industrial, as well as civil and political."\(^9\)

The importance of democracy in the workplace as well as at the ballot box, and the idea of democracy as an ethic as well as a political mechanism were to become central features in Dewey's idea of democracy. Given this expansive notion of participatory democracy and Dewey's commitment to it, it is not surprising that Lippmann's book posed such a challenge for Dewey.
Lippmann's national position and the sophistication of his argument captured Dewey's attention. In addition, Dewey was impressed by the art and force of Lippmann's argument. A few months after the book's publication, Dewey published a review of it in The New Republic. Dewey wrote, “The figures of the scene are so composed and so stand out, the manner of presentation is so objective and projective, that one finishes the book almost without realizing that it is perhaps the most effective indictment of democracy as currently conceived ever penned.”

Dewey wrote that “Lippmann’s relentless and realistic analysis of the limitations of the pictures in our head about the environment and his account of the methods by which the privileged few supply a supplement and substitute, so skillfully that the mass still thinks that its opinions are valid and spontaneous, is the undeniably successful part of his book.... It shivers most of our illusions, and this particular Humpty Dumpty can never be put together again for anyone who reads these chapters with an open mind.”

Dewey found himself in substantial agreement with Lippmann's analysis of the rise of the “manufacture of consent” and the dire consequences it holds for democratic government. However, Dewey was uneasy about the solution Lippmann advanced.

Where Lippmann dismisses the newspaper — the press — as inadequate to the task of enlightening and directing public opinion, Dewey argued that the press must continue to serve as a vital link between government and the people. Many of Lippmann's criticisms of the press are valid, but they are criticisms of the press as it now operates. The press, Dewey argued, is what is in need of reform. In the press there must be a union of social science in gathering the facts and art in the presentation of those facts in order to engage the individual as a citizen.

In a democracy, Dewey wrote, “The enlightenment of public opinion still seems to me to have priority over the enlightenment of officials and directors.” Dewey recognized Lippmann attempted to sketch out the means to control the new aristocracy of administrators from becoming a dangerous self-interested power block. However, for Dewey, the safeguards Lippmann proposes were not only inadequate but undemocratic. The only true safeguard is the democratic process itself.

Dewey was clearly shaken by Lippmann's argument and although he pieced together a response to Lippmann's elitist solution, Dewey acknowledged that his response at this time was based more on “feeling” than careful argument. Before Dewey could construct that careful argument, Lippmann issued his second major attack on participatory democracy in his book The Phantom Public.
Lippmann: Abandoning Democracy and Science

As relentless as Lippmann had been in *Public Opinion* in his attack on the realistic possibilities of democracy, in the conclusion he still clung to a faith in the idea of democracy. "It is necessary to live as if good will would work.... It is not foolish for men to believe ... that intelligence, courage and effort cannot ever contrive a good life for all men."^53

In *The Phantom Public*, Lippmann abandoned all hope for government guided by its citizens. Lippmann wrote, "The individual man does not have opinions on all public affairs. He does not know how to direct public affairs. He does not know what is happening, why it is happening, what ought to happen. I cannot imagine how he could know, and there is not the least reason for thinking, as mystical democrats have thought, that the compounding of individual ignorances in masses of people can produce a continuous directing force in public affairs."^54

The public should not be thought of as an active agent of government, Lippmann argued. At best, the public should be thought of as a mildly involved spectator of public affairs, incapable of directing those affairs or of judging right from wrong, but perhaps capable of crying foul when the rules of the game are breached and stopping conflict among the leaders from turning to violence. The public, Lippmann continued, is not even fit to judge which rules are right or wrong, but only that some rules are necessary. The exercise of government should be let to the few informed men of action, a group divided between those currently in power, the Ins, and those seeking power, the Outs. In other words, Lippmann wrote, the only practical role for the public is "To support the Ins when things are going well; to support the Outs when they seem to be going badly, this, in spite of all that has been said about tweedledum and tweedledee, is the essence of popular government."^55

In Lippmann's efforts to protect society from the "trampling and the roar of the bewildered herd" he not only abandoned democracy in all but name, but also two fundamental assumptions upon which the idea of democracy had been built. The first was that a true unified society, nation, or community exists. Jettisoning this assumption was not surprising given the portrait of the public which Lippmann had drawn. However, in a chapter titled "Society In Its Place," Lippmann also appeared to abandon his earlier hope that science can save democracy.

Contrary to his argument in *Public Opinion*, Lippmann now argued that there is no privileged epistemology of science that can provide humankind with an untainted glimpse of the world. The Enlightenment and the philosophy of liberalism which it gave birth to, Lippmann argued, unleashed a critical insight that not only undermined any belief in a metaphysical world, but finally revealed that all knowledge is human made and self-interested, even, Lippmann implied, the knowledge we call science.

In a sense, Lippmann accepted the idea of the total relativity of knowledge implied by the wider crisis of a belief in facts provoked by the relativity of knowledge claimed by Nietzsche, the irrationality of the consciousness discovered by Freud, and the instability of even "scientific knowledge" implied by the work of Einstein.
In the reason of the Enlightenment, Lippmann wrote, man “was shown the history of his ideas and of his customs, and he was driven to acknowledge that they were bounded by time and space and circumstance. He was shown that there is a bias in all opinion, even in opinions purged of desire, for the man who holds the opinion must stand at some point in space and time and can see not the whole world but only the world from that point.”\textsuperscript{56}

And this leads us to the heart of Lippmann’s despair that this essay began with. The philosophy of liberalism that was supposed to set humankind free, also destroyed all moral authority, metaphysical or scientific. It was in this context Lippmann had compared liberalism to a flame burning out of control, burning down the barn “to roast the pig.”\textsuperscript{57} The consequence for democratic government, Lippmann wrote, was that liberalism, to save itself from moral relativity, had to claim some mysterious guiding force existed in the collective known as “the people” or “the public.”

The problem for democracy, Lippmann argued, is that no such entity as “the people” or “the public” exists. However, the idea of liberalism, that the people rule, even though it is not true or possible, is still an important idea, Lippmann claimed, because in the exercise of government “it tends to awaken a milder spirit: it softens the hardness of action.”\textsuperscript{58} The goal of government can no longer be justice because everyone has a different idea of what that might be. The goal of government can only be “workable adjustment” to change and crisis. The role of the ambiguous “public” can only be “spectators of action” helping to minimize violent conflict among the ruling elite.

In contrast to the acclaim accorded Public Opinion, The Phantom Public was panned by most reviewers for its cynical assessment of the future of democracy. The book soon went out of print and was largely ignored or forgotten by political scientists and mass media scholars. Ironically, the one mildly favorable review came from the man who most held the greatest hope for a participatory democracy of active citizens: Dewey.

**Dewey: A Second Response**

As with Public Opinion, Dewey found the logic as well as the art of Lippmann’s presentation masterful, calling it “clear, extraordinarily so considering the fundamental and controverted issues it raises.”\textsuperscript{59} And remarkably, given the thrust of Lippmann’s arguments and the book’s rejection by almost every other reviewer, Dewey found it “constructive.”

While Dewey charged it was possible to quote specific passages removed from their context to give the impression that Lippmann had given up on democracy, he found the essay “in reality a statement of faith in a pruned and temperate democratic theory, and a presentation of methods by which a reasonable conception of democracy can be made to work, not absolutely, but at least better than democracy works under an exaggerated and undisciplined notion of the public and its powers.”\textsuperscript{60}

It is quite likely even Lippmann, whose bitterness repeatedly breaks into his argument, would have been surprised by Dewey’s optimistic assessment of his work.
In largely the same fashion as his review of Public Opinion, Dewey agreed with the analysis of the situation, but argued a different solution. Dewey agreed with Lippmann that the public is not capable of “executive action,” of “the intellectual anticipation of a problem, its analysis and solution,” and of handling the “specific, technical, intimate criteria” of a question. Further Dewey agreed that the task of the public is to “be the judge and umpire of last resort, to be able to compel submission of important issues to popular judgment, to force political governors to appear now and then on trial before their constituents to give a reckoning of their stewardship.” He suggested that it is unlikely that the historical spokesmen of democracy ever intended much more.

Dewey also agreed that the great danger of the fiction that a cohesive public voice exists and governs is that a few insiders govern as they always have, except now “acting for ends of their own, they claim to be agents of a public will” and “bamboozle the public” to get their support.

Dewey began to turn Lippmann’s argument back toward participatory democracy, not by directly challenging him, but by pushing his argument even further in the direction Lippmann had already charted. If the so-called public is realistically called on to intervene only on occasion, in its present state, Dewey argued, it is not even fit for that. “It is difficult to see how even occasional intervening action of the general public is to be made effective in the ways in which he [Lippmann] postulates until the group activities upon which it operates are better organized and more open to recognition, more exposed to that identification of the partisan and his purposes which is the aim of democratic technique.” In other words, Dewey argued, the public, or the various publics of which the general public is composed, must be better organized and more aware of their own self-interests. And is not this, Dewey implied, what real democracy is after all.

Where Lippmann thought he had found a reason to give up on the public, its value only resided in its occasional intervention, Dewey found an argument for strengthening the public’s consciousness of itself and its power. Dewey’s turn toward the public as opposed to Lippmann’s turn away from it had a deeper motivation which, Dewey argued, Lippmann missed.

Lippmann, Dewey argued, fundamentally abandoned the public because of its inherent irrationality. Dewey countered that the public, exercising its power as a democracy, has not held a monopoly over irrationality or the abuse of power. History, recent and ancient, is filled with chilling examples of irrationality and abuse of power exercised by religious leaders and kings. Democracy is not a guarantee against the abuse of power, Dewey argued, but neither is it the cause of abuse. The solution to the weaknesses of democracy as it is practiced is not to abandon it, but attend to the problems of the public with the goal of strengthening it.

Again, Dewey’s response to Lippmann was just a sketch put forward in the limited space of a book review. Dewey would finally present his most direct response in a series of lectures delivered at Kenyon College in Ohio during January 1926. These lectures were gathered into a book and published in 1927 as The Public and Its Problems. However, Dewey also wrote two other books published during the same period which also carried
forward his defense of participatory democracy. These were *Experience and Nature*, published in 1925, and *The Quest for Certainty*, published in 1929.

**The Public and Its Problems: Misunderstanding Science and Democracy**

In this book Dewey turned to the problem not just of Walter Lippmann, but of the growing faction of intellectuals and leaders he represented: the democratic realists. The major themes sounded by Lippmann were shared by the democratic realists. First and foremost was the belief in the fundamental irrationality of men and women. The second related theme was that the minimization of participation of the masses in public life was consequently a necessary goal. Third, to preserve democracy it must be redefined as rule for the people but not by the people. Rule would be by informed and responsible “men of action.”

*The Public and Its Problems* was a key part of Dewey’s formal response. It was a battle that Dewey and others fighting for a vision of participatory democracy would lose, but has resurfaced again and again in democratic theory and action.

Dewey would have to address Lippmann, and the democratic realists, on a number of fronts. Was there such a thing as the public? What was its relationship to democratic government? Why not turn government over to the experts instead of an irrational mob? Could the press save democracy?

Lippmann saw these as related, yet separate questions, in much the same way as most contemporary critics of the press and public opinion. Dewey saw these questions as intricately interwoven. At the heart of Dewey’s argument was that Lippmann, and the democratic realists in general, were calling for the replacement of democracy with science without understanding either. This was the task Dewey set for himself, to argue for a broader conception of democracy and a reconsideration of the meaning of science and its relationship to democracy. Dewey had already begun to sketch out these positions in his earlier book reviews. Now he would fill in those sketches.

**Phantom Public or the Eclipse of the Public**

Dewey agreed with much of Lippmann’s bleak assessment of the current state of democracy. But where Lippmann saw this as evidence of the hopelessness of turning the complex duties of government over to a “phantom public,” Dewey saw the situation as simply another moment in the evolution of democracy, a moment which held great potential but did not guarantee that this potential would be realized. Where Lippmann believed that an actual public had never existed, Dewey believed that the public, or various publics, were an inevitable outcome of human association. The problem faced in the post-war years was that the public was in a state of “eclipse.” It had lost the means to come to a full recognition of itself.

To understand Dewey’s position it is necessary to look more carefully at his definition of a public and his explanation about how it comes into existence. Dewey wrote:
Conjoint, combined, associated action is a universal trait of the behavior of things. Such action has results. Some of the results of human collective action are perceived, that is, they are noted in such ways that they are taken account of. Then there arise purposes, plans, measures and means, to secure consequences which are liked and eliminate those which are found obnoxious. Thus perception generates a common interest; that is, those affected by the consequences are perforce concerned in conduct of all those who along with themselves share in bringing about results. Sometimes the consequences are confined to those who directly share in the transaction which produces them. In other cases they extend far beyond those engaged in producing them.... Those indirectly and seriously enough affected for good or for evil form a a group distinctively enough to require recognition and a name. The name selected is The Public.

Dewey, like Lippmann, began not with some abstract idea of the natural and inalienable rights of man to construct the definition of a public, but with the actual workings of human activity. However, where Lippmann focused on the irrationality of the public and the means by which they are manipulated, Dewey began with the fundamentally social character of human existence. The public, then, comes into being as a group of people who perceive the particular consequences that have an impact outside of their immediate experience, of their associated behavior. In these terms the public may go into eclipse, that is, lose track of its shared interests, but it can never disappear, that is, become Lippmann’s “phantom public.” The public always has the potential to re-form itself when it becomes self-aware of its inevitable interdependencies.

**THE PUBLIC AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT**

For Lippmann the public was a theoretical fiction and government was primarily an administrative problem to be solved as efficiently as possible, so that people could get on with their own individualistic pursuits. Given this view, it was a short step to downplay the role of the people in government and to elevate the role of the expert. Democracy was considered a limited political idea useful primarily for minimizing violence among the rulers.

Dewey’s view of the public led him in a completely different direction. For Dewey, the formation of government flows directly out of the formation of the public. It is not an activity separate from the public. Dewey wrote, “the perception of consequences which are projected in important ways beyond the persons and associations directly concerned in them is the source of the public; and that its organization into a state is effected by establishing special agencies to care for and regulate these consequences.” Government is established as a consequence of the public’s efforts to manage its interactions. The form that government has taken to regulate the indirect consequences of association has been, in part, an accident of circumstances and,
in part, the result of having to take into account new observations of indirect consequences of social activity.

According to Dewey, viewed historically and practically, the primary problem of the public is "to achieve such recognition of itself as will give it weight in the selection of official representatives and in the definition of their responsibilities and rights." In this sense, Dewey argued, it is possible to see the intimate relationship between the public and not just government in general, but democratic government.

The history of the development of democracy is not the history of the unfolding of the mythic guiding ideal of democratic practice, but "the net consequence of a vast multitude of responsive adjustments to a vast number of situations, no two of which were alike, but which tended to converge to a common outcome." The ideas of "the nature of the individual and his rights, of freedom and authority, progress and order, liberty and law, of the common good and a general will, of democracy itself" did not produce democracy but reflected it in thought. For Dewey the movement to democracy is built into the social character of existence. The need then, Dewey argued, is not to invent a definition of democracy, but to discover its definition as a practice.

The convergence of history in the practice of political democracy as a solution to protecting the interests of the public, provides a clue to the deeper meaning of democracy as a social phenomenon. In other words, democracy can be defined by examining the specific interests that the public was trying to achieve in repeatedly moving in the direction of political democracy.

In constructing the general meaning of democracy from the lived actions of the public, Dewey arrived at the following definition:

From the standpoint of the individual, it consists in having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the group sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and goods which are common. Since every individual is a member of many groups, this specification cannot be fulfilled except when different groups interact flexibly and fully in connection with other groups. There is a free give-and-take: fullness of integrated personality is therefore possible of achievement, since the pulls and responses of different groups reinforce one another and their values accord.

In this sense Dewey was offering democracy not as one among many alternatives to how social life could be carried out. Rather he viewed it as the embodiment of community life itself. But he did not consider it an ideal toward which society is moving. Instead he saw it as a tendency built into the very structure of social activity.

The root of democracy is in the social character of human existence that
constantly moves people into community. To declare the public non-existent, as Lippmann did, is not to argue for a subtle redefinition of democracy. In Dewey's terms it is to misrecognize the very meaning of democracy and significantly cripple its potential for further development. The reason for the problems of democracy described by Lippmann is not the impossibility of a public, but that other new forces in society, primarily technological development and the rise of capitalism, have so restructured human relations, that the public has lost its sense of itself. The solution is not to abandon the public in favor of science, but to help the public recover itself.

Bad Science: Severing Truth From Justice

In 1925, building on the Einstein's theory of relativity, German physicist Werner Heisenberg introduced the principle of indeterminacy. The principle helped shatter the Newtonian idea of the physical world as composed of fixed substances and laws. Heisenberg established that energy, the basic unit of reality according to relativity theory, could be either wave-like or particle-like depending on how the scientific observation was made. The method of observation influenced what was observed.

While Lippmann never commented directly on Heisenberg's work, it is likely that he would have found it deeply troubling because it erased any hope for an objective science to discover objective laws of the universe. In reference to Einstein, Lippmann wrote to a friend:

I remember reading President Wilson's statement about how political speculations are colored by the prevailing current view of the physical universe.... It is one of the most illuminating ideas to an understanding of political theories. It is obvious now that just as Darwin supplanted Newtonian physics as the prevailing intellectual fashion, so today Darwinism is out-moded. The difficulty is that the prevailing physics as set forth, I won't say by Einstein for none of us understands him correctly, but by the disciples of Einstein ... simply does not lend itself to myth-making. The result is that our political thinking today has no intellectual foundation....

Where Lippmann found a void in the "new" science, Dewey found inspiration for a science and a politics grounded in human experience. Much of Dewey's argument about the relationship between the epistemology of science and democracy was scattered across his writing, including The Public and its Problems. However its most concise statement was made in The Quest for Certainty.

Dewey argued that the fundamental character of nature was a combination of precariousness and stability. As much as one could find what appeared to be stability in nature's order, one could not ignore the constant fact of uncertainty. Simply desiring that life could be more predictable, could not make it so.
For humankind, its capacity to engage in reflective thought provided the best means to cope with uncertainty. Reflective thought gave rise to two distinct forms of experience, one cognitive and one aesthetic. Cognitive experience, or science, sought to bring order and predictability to life by engaging in a process of abstraction. In the process of abstraction, science paid attention not to things as they were, that is, not to the individual and unique experience one has of things and events, but what these things and events share with others similar experiences and events.

By treating unique, changing moments of experience as stable, uniform objects, science could establish a certain degree of predictability of relationships. It could establish some degree of control over the uncertainty of nature. At the same time, aesthetic experience was based on the unique experiencing of things in and of themselves. Pleasure and suffering were aspects of one's response to the uniqueness of experience.

Cognitive experience, or science, gave the impression that things could be known as they were. Aesthetic experience provided the reminder that the uniqueness of experience could never be known in a cognitive, abstracted sense, it could only be felt. At the heart of the aesthetic experience was the appreciation of unique qualities. At the heart of the cognitive experience was the denial of unique qualities. This was the price paid for control.

The world, Dewey argued, was subsequently divided into what could be known and therefore controlled and what could not be known and therefore only experienced. What could be known became the stuff of the world. What could not be known became other-worldly. Everyday life became organized around what could be known, and the process of bringing the world under control. This was the “inferior” world in “which man could foresee and in which he had instruments and arts by which he might expect a reasonable degree of control.” What was other-worldly and therefore superior was the realm “of occurrences so uncontrollable that they testified to the presence and operation of powers beyond the scope of everyday and mundane things.”

In this way the world was broken into the practical and the religious.

Dewey suggested that this dualism of the practical and the religious, science and God, was largely accepted and respected up to and including the time of Newton. Newton and his contemporaries were for the most part pious men. They saw the work of science as fundamentally in line with the work of God. Even though the Roman Catholic Church and individual theologians attacked much of the work of science as heresy, most scientists thought of their work as giving witness “to the Glory of the Great Author of Nature.”

However, the scientific revolution, unleashed through the application of abstract mathematics and mechanics to scientific discovery, soon began to undermine any justification of a belief in other-worldly things. Dewey wrote:

According to the religious and philosophic tradition of Europe the valid status of all the highest values, the good, true, and beautiful, was bound up with their being properties of ultimate and supreme being, namely God. All went well as long as what passed for
natural science gave no offense to this conception. Trouble began when science ceased to disclose in the objects of knowledge the possession of any such properties. Then some roundabout method had to be devised for substantiating them.74

Science had cut the world off from any source of value. Philosophy became the effort to somehow cobble together the split between science and morality, objectivity and subjectivity, knowledge and values, truth and justice. Then science, as a method of rational inquiry, compounded the problem. Not only had science argued away any empirical basis for a belief in God or higher-order values, it also began to whittle away at its own authority. Not only did God not exist, but the real world itself, as an object, was also outside of direct perception.

This was, for instance, the muddy world of science and God that Immanuel Kant had tackled a hundred years earlier in an effort to find some sort of harmony between science and morality, between truth and justice. Kant agreed that the world could not be known directly. However, Kant argued, the power of science lay not in its correspondence to some real world, but in the unity of the rational order scientists discovered. And although science had found no basis for God or values in the real world, there is proof, of a sort, of his existence in the fact that scientists are able to construct a single rational description of the workings of the world. Scientists, in essence Kant argued, were discovering the order of God.

Into this epistemological and moral crisis stepped Lippmann and the democratic realists. Somehow they had to choose between the power of science, which was so clearly evident everywhere in its capacity to transform nature according to the will of man, and mushy notions of abstract rights such as liberty and equality which were born in some other-worldly place, such as God or “the public”: to choose between the truth of science and some other-worldly notion of justice.

At first, in Public Opinion, Lippmann straddled the fence arguing for truth and justice: truth as scientific truth and justice as democracy. He argued, however, quite a bit harder for science. Finally he had no evidence for democracy, only hope and faith. In The Phantom Public, Lippmann followed his own logic, the logic of science, to its conclusion. He made the Nietzschean leap, recognizing that science had undermined all values, all authority, even the authority of science. The point of both and science and democracy, in the world prophesied by Lippmann in The Phantom Public, was simply to minimize violence as society made its adjustments to inevitable change.

For Lippmann, Einstein and his followers merely confirmed the relativity of truth and values. As Lippmann pushed journalism in the direction of science, of objectivity, it was with the naive optimism which lay behind Public Opinion, not the cynical belief of The Phantom Public, that objectivity itself would reveal its own relativity.

However, where Lippmann saw a choice to be made between the world and the other-worldly, between science and values, objectivity and subjec-
tivity, Dewey did not. For Dewey it was a false and unnecessary choice. The idea of science, Dewey argued, in its pursuit of certainty, had gotten out of hand. It had forgot its humble beginnings in human experience. It had forgotten its relationship with the uniqueness of human existence, with the source of value. Science, in coming to believe that knowing was outside of human experience, instead of a direct result of that experience, had left all the questions of moral life to "custom, external pressure and the free play of impulse."

Science, Dewey argued, is useful in its place, which is in the service of human interests, not outside of those interests. When science sets as its goal the quest for absolute certainty, absolute control, it becomes merely reason, which "designates both an inherent immutable order of nature, super empirical in character, and the organ of the mind by which this universal order is grasped. In both respects, reason is with respect to changing things the ultimate fixed standard—the law physical phenomena obey, the norm human action should obey."

Dewey acknowledged that science's fixation on certainty, and philosophy's support of this goal, was not simply by accident. Discoverable historical forces were at work. And it was no accident that Dewey opened The Public and it Problems, as had Lippmann, with an epistemological problem. However where Lippmann used science to gloss over the problems raised by the relativity of perception, Dewey used the relativity of perceptions to make a point about science.

"Political facts," Dewey wrote, "are not outside human desire and judgment. Change men's estimate of the value of existing political agencies and forms, and the latter [facts] change more or less." Consequently, Dewey argued, it is foolish to say that the facts speak for themselves. The real question is not "What are the facts?," but "By what right do we act?"

Put somewhat differently, Dewey argued that society must abandon the claims of reason and replace them with the judgment of intelligence. Science, set free from any social context and focused only on control, had produced reason. Knowledge appears as if it is separated from values, truth from justice.

Intelligence, as Dewey used the term, recognizes that knowledge is always value based. Simply declaring knowledge separate from values does not make it so. It only obscures the values behind knowledge. Intelligence is "associated with judgment; that is, with selection and arrangement of means to effect consequences and with choice of what we take as our ends. A man is intelligent not by virtue of having reason that grasps first and in demonstrable truths about fixed principles, in order to reason deductively from them to the particulars which they govern, but by virtue of his capacity..."
to estimate the possibilities of a situation and to act in accordance with his estimate. 78

Scientism, science based only on reason, pretends as if it has nothing to do with democracy because democracy can be viewed as a moral statement about how society should be organized. Science based on intelligence is intimately linked with democracy. The conditions necessary for the pursuit of science are the same as those required for the practice of democracy: free inquiry, tolerance of diversity, and freedom of expression.

In addition, the method of science, once it has surrendered the false belief that it can directly observe the world, depends on its social character: science proceeds based on shared knowledge. “Everything discovered,” Dewey wrote, “belongs to the community of workers. Every new idea and theory has to be submitted to this community for confirmation and test. There is an expanding community of cooperative effort and truth.” 79 At a more mechanical level, science provides an increasingly sophisticated means for society to assess the character of its interdependence and the consequences, intended and unintended, of associated behavior. In this sense science is merely the extension of reflective thinking, a trait critical for the public to come into consciousness of itself.

But perhaps most deeply, the link between science and democracy is this: to the extent that science is seen as the refinement of cognitive experience to achieve some control over the uncertainty of nature, one must ask in whose interest does this control operate? Scientism, the presentation of science as reason, seeks control in the interests of those who “possess” knowledge. Dewey wrote that the scientistic application of science to regulate industry and trade has gone on steadily:

The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century was the precursor of the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth. In consequence, man has suffered the impact of enormously enlarged control of physical energies without and corresponding ability to control himself and his own affairs. Knowledge divided against itself, a science to whose incompleteness is added an artificial split (between science and values], has played its part in generating enslavement of men, women and children in factories in which they are animated machines to tend inanimate machines.... The instrumentality [of science] becomes a master and works fatally as if possessed of a will of its own— not because it has a will but because man has not. 80

Science understood as intelligence, as a social product of community life, would also seek control, but a control directed by “that common understanding and thorough communication which is the precondition of the existence of a genuine public.” It would be the interests of the public as a community that would guide science, and the experiences of people in the community which would form the judgment as to the consequences of the knowledge. Science would not behave as if it had nothing to do with the

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community. The test of the value to the knowledge is not, Dewey argued, in its ability to control nature or people, but in its capacity to realize the values of the public as judged by the public. Meaning depends on its social consequences.

**Dewey: Communication and Democracy**

Ironically, Lippmann, often heralded as one of the founding figures of modern journalism and media studies, substantially downgraded the role to be played by the press in democracy. In Lippmann’s scientistic view of the press and democracy, the press was ill-suited to inform the public and the public was ill-suited to be informed. Scientifically informed experts would, for the most part, substitute for the phantom public in the act of governing.

Dewey, on the other hand, saw an intimate relationship between science, the public, and government. He believed communication is central to democracy not only in a mechanical role linking citizens together, but also in an epistemological role helping to define what will be taken as truth, as well as in a moral role providing an everyday answer to the apparent contradiction between the interests of the individual and society.

The mechanical importance of communication to Dewey was clear. Advances in the means of communication increase the potential size of a group with shared interests. As a group becomes larger, for it to possess a sense of itself through understanding the interdependent consequences of individual and group actions, communication is essential. Further, for a public to act as a public requires open and free communication in order to inform itself of the current state of affairs and to debate the consequences of individual and associated behavior in order to judge their value in terms of the shared interests of the public.

The importance of communication in this mechanical sense is fairly familiar because it expresses the role communication is expected to play in the liberal theory of democracy. It is this role that Lippmann believed was no longer possible due to the size and complexity of government and the basic irrationality of human action. But where Lippmann’s conception of communication ended here, Dewey’s did not. Dewey also believed that communication plays a critical epistemological role, not simply in transmitting knowledge from one person to another, but creating the very meanings that will be called knowledge.

According to Dewey, the experience of the world through our senses remains just that — unique, sensual aesthetic experience, felt experience — until we impose an order on that experience. And the primary ordering
system we have is language. Language precedes thought. Language allows us to think, to engage in cognitive reflection, to ‘know.’ Communication, as language, is the fundamental way we come to understand the world. A critical point here is that language itself is a socially constructed symbol system. Language is a system of shared meanings that have been socially produced. The consequence, Dewey argued, is that it is never possible to individually engage in thought. To think is to draw on socially produced symbols, categories, and meanings. To think is to be in relationship to a language producing community.

This, Dewey pointed out, is a central paradox which scientism denies or ignores. Science as a way of coming to know the world is always rooted in the social world because it depends on socially produced language to think. It is never “knowing” outside of human interests.

It is in this sense that Dewey wrote, “Of all affairs communication is the most wonderful. That things should be able to pass from the plane of external pushing and pulling to that of revealing themselves to man, and thereby to themselves; and that the fruit of communication should be participation, sharing, is a wonder by the side of which transubstantiation pales.”

Communication as language serves a critical epistemological function providing the means to engage in thinking: allowing us to “know” the world but always in reference to our social existence. At the same time communication contains a moral first principle, not as a definition of absolute good or bad, but in the form of a method of social being. This first principle is that “Shared experience is the greatest of human goods.” Communication and knowing require language. Language requires the cooperative production of system of shared meaning. In these terms, the individual and society do not stand in opposition, but are mutually dependent on each other for their existence.

Dewey wrote:

Communication is uniquely instrumental and uniquely final. It is instrumental as liberating us from the otherwise overwhelming pressure of events and enabling us to live in a world of things that have meaning. It is final as a sharing in the objects precious to a community, sharing whereby meanings are enhanced, deepened and solidified in the sense of communion. Because of its characteristic agency and finality, communication and its congenial objects are objects ultimately worthy of awe, admiration and loyal appreciation. They are worthy as means, because they are only means that make life rich and varied in meanings. They are worthy as ends, because in such ends man is lifted from his immediate isolation and shares in a communion of meanings.... When the instrumental and final functions of communication live together in experience, there exists intelligence which is the method and reward of the common life, and a society worthy to command affection, admiration and loyalty.
For Dewey, democracy was not “an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself. It is an ideal in the only intelligible sense of an ideal: namely, the tendency and movement of some thing which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected.” Dewey was not saying that the achievement of perfect democracy is a final goal, but that the democratic process of social organization is the best way to ensure that people can develop, individually and cooperatively, to their fullest potential. It is clear then, given Dewey’s conception of communication and democracy, why he could not, as Lippmann had done, abandon the press.

Dewey and the Press

Dewey argued that the only purpose of government is to represent the interests of the public. To turn over the right to speak for the public to any person or group other than the public itself is to invite the potential for tyranny, whether by a king or a scientific aristocracy.

The press, according to Dewey, becomes the critical instrument for both keeping the public in touch with itself and with the actions of those who govern in its name. This is the standard liberal argument for the press that Lippmann so effectively attacked.

It is here that the full power of Dewey’s understanding of the interrelationships between the public, democracy, science, and communication came to bear. The informing function and the watchdog function of the press are not the sum total of all the press is up to. For Dewey the press is literally involved in the invention of the social world within which each of us lives. The scientific method does not provide an inside track for scientists to discover truths unknown to the public. If something is unknown to the public, in Dewey’s terms, it is not shared knowledge and if it is not shared knowledge it isn’t knowledge at all. The test of the truth of knowledge is not, as scientism argues, simply whether or not it allows prediction or control of the natural world, but whether or not it allows prediction or control of the natural world in such a way that it serves the interest of the public as judged by the public.

In this sense, the purpose of news is not just to inform, but to make “public” the results of scientific inquiry so that they may be debated and judged according to the needs and interests of the community. News that adheres to a scientistic notion of epistemology is, in Dewey’s terms, truth that appears to be outside of the control of human interests or values. It creates the possibility of raising claims to truth without raising questions of justice.

This is what Dewey meant when he wrote that “knowledge is communication as well as understanding.” It is why, Dewey argued that a crucial function of the press, and particularly a press in a democracy is making ideas public. “Knowledge cooped up in a private consciousness is a myth, and knowledge of social phenomena is peculiarly dependent upon dissemina-

For Dewey the press is literally involved in the invention of the social world within which each of us lives.
tion, for only by distribution can such knowledge be either obtained or tested. A fact of community life which is not spread abroad so as to be a common possession is a contradiction in terms. The test of knowledge is not to be carried out only in a scientific laboratory or on a factory floor, but in its consequences for everyday life as judged by the people who will experience those consequences.

The press then has an epistemological as well as a moral function in fixing, though publicity, what will be taken as our shared understanding of the social world. When Dewey wrote that the question of knowledge is not only one of facts, but also the question of in whose interest the facts are assembled and interpreted, he was calling attention to these interrelated roles. If the principle guiding the interrelationship of the press, the public and science is to be democratic, the press must play a critical role in insuring that the final authority as to what constitutes knowledge must be the public. Or put into terms used above, knowledge must be understood to be based on intelligence rather than perceived to be based on mere reason. The goal of the press must be to help ensure that "the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying consequences of associated activities shall be known in the full sense of that word, so that an organized, articulate Public comes into being."

No Women in the Public

It is interesting to note that even though 1920 marked the fruition of the women's movement's struggle to win the right to vote and the Lippmann-Dewey exchange took place in the years immediately following this enormous reconfiguration of the political environment, neither man had much if anything to say about women and the public.

Looking at Lippmann, this empty space is not surprising. Lippmann supported the suffragette movement and could appreciate the movement's sophisticated mastery of the new art of publicity in making news. But his ability to see the world in compartmentalized terms and to see a clear line dividing the world between the scientific and the irrational, allowed him not to be overly troubled by the border between domestic and public life, between the public and the private sphere. If the women's movement had the potential for signifying a new kind of politics or at least perhaps empowering the Progressive tradition, the aftermath of the presidential election of 1920 yielded, for Lippmann, a fairly ambiguous result. "Unless one is prepared to regard the election as the final twitch of the war mind (that is the way I regard it)," Lippmann wrote, "there would be cause for profound discouragement with universal suffrage."

Looking at Dewey, this lack of attention to gender in his consideration of the public is surprising. While up to and throughout the 1920s Dewey had written little about women, what he had written was consistent with the complex idea of democracy, science, and communication that has been examined here. As early as 1894 Dewey wrote that "the prevalent theory of the essentially conservative nature of women's intelligence [is but] a fiction of the male intelligence, maintained in order to keep [her] inconvenient
radicalism in check.” In 1919 he wrote that while “women have as yet made little contribution to philosophy... when women set out to write it” their “viewpoint or tenor” will be very different from the male perspective because one’s philosophical view is forged by one’s “habitual purposes and cultivated wants,” not “insight into the ultimate nature of things or information about the make-up of reality.”

It seems clear that Dewey should have understood that in his analysis of the formation of the public, in the realization of democracy as a living, active relationship between the individual and society, the historical conditions of gender oppression would have to be addressed. And yet these matters were left unacknowledged.

Instead, Dewey like progressive social theorists to follow him, including Christopher Lasch with his “haven in a heartless world” and Jurgen Habermas with his “life world,” had a tendency to see in the domestic sphere an idealized counterpart to the increasing scientization and industrialization of social life. Dewey idealized the old-fashioned farm kitchen as a model for an organic and integrated life without recognizing that traditional domestic life was not just an organic counterpart to the instrumental logic of industrial capitalism, but it was also a stronghold for the maintenance and reproduction of gender oppression. As Jane S. Upin wrote in her study of the intersections between the work of Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Dewey, “despite his continual celebration of democratic values, Dewey did not see that the home can be a poor training ground for democracy.”

At the same time, unlike Lippmann’s work, which represented for all practical purposes a dead-end for thinking about gender politics in relation to the public and to democracy, Dewey’s own work was in sympathy with many critical themes in feminist political theory and can even be used to critique his own neglect of women in his consideration of the public as well as contribute to contemporary theory. Dewey’s critique of scientism that “political facts are not outside human desire and judgment,” that science understood as mere reason masks the ideology of scientism, that the work of publicity is not simply to disseminate information but to provide the conditions under which the validity of knowledge can be ascertained, not in its ability to control nature or people but in its capacity to realize the values of an inclusive public as judged by the same inclusive public, is very much in concert with the critiques of scientism by Sandra Harding, Carol Gilligan, and Dorothy Smith. Dewey’s understanding of democracy as community, as based on the fundamentally social character of human existence, of the misleading dichotomy between the private and the social, are observations that all resonate with the feminist political theory of Nancy Frazer, Johanna Meehan, and Barbara Marshall.

In fact, the correspondences between Dewey and feminism and the recent revival of Deweyian theory have, in part, contributed to a significant scholarly interest in reexamining the terrain linking feminism and pragmatism.

What are the implications of the absence of women in this Lippmann-Dewey debate that is now regarded as philosophically foundational by the
public journalism movement? The news is not good. Lippmann and Dewey’s neglect of gender politics has made it easier for contemporary media scholars recovering this historic moment to also neglect gender, focusing on the metaphor of the work of the press as civic conversation, without facing up to the current material conditions which either continue to muffle women’s voices in this conversation or continue to define women’s issues as outside of or marginal to serious matters of the public and civic life. For instance, as Nancy Frazer has written, poverty is viewed as a gender-neutral social problem even though structurally the United States has witnessed a progressive feminization of poverty over the last two decades. At the same time childcare is seen as a women’s issue, as if the work of raising and educating children is not fundamental to the society as a whole.

Put somewhat differently, the neglect of gender politics by Lippmann and Dewey and the recovery and reconstruction of the neglect allow the public journalism movement to both ignore the politics of epistemology and the gendered character of those politics.

In terms of the historical connections between the Lippmann-Dewey debate and current scholarly energy organized around the idea of the public sphere, the news is more hopeful. The deeper impulses of Deweyian pragmatism and a pragmatic Critical Theory as developed by Habermas and others have carried forward the sophisticated concern for the interrelationship of epistemology, power and communication while leaving open the space for self-critique from the feminist tradition. Again, however, neither the epistemological politics of Dewey nor the feminist challenge to a patriarchal conception of the public sphere seem to have made much headway in the public journalism movement.

**Lippmann, Dewey, and the Post-Factual Age**

Lippmann understood that simple bias was not all that would trouble the modern press. The problem went beyond bias, to the very questioning of the existence of facts. In short he saw the post-factual world and feared it. The absence of facts and the primacy of subjective perceptions meant for Lippmann, a world paralyzed by relativity. The post-factual world symbolized another step, after the decline of religion and erosion of the stabilizing forces of tradition, toward a world of dangerous uncertainty.

At first Lippmann put his hope in science as the solution to the crisis of the fact. This was the solution he advocated in *Public Opinion*. The idea of separating facts from values had been around for some time in the practice
of journalism, but in the 1920s, in the face of a growing recognition of the problem of subjectivity this idea became forcefully organized around the concept of objectivity and became a central principle in the professionalization of journalism. It is ironic that even though Lippmann is often cited in journalism history as one of the central voices contributing to the establishment of the principle of objectivity in journalism, he himself did not believe the press could be objective, in part due to its organizational structure and in part due to its commercial orientation.

Soon after, in The Phantom Public, Lippmann abandoned even his faith in science. Still he understood the importance of some form of moral authority in society. By 1929, in A Preface to Morals, after dismissing religion and science, Lippmann wrote that his generation “having ceased to believe without ceasing to be credulous, hangs, as it were, between heaven and earth and is at rest nowhere.” Lippmann ended up advocating a form of secular humanism which seemed oddly inconsistent with any of his arguments of the previous decade. However, serving up hope seemed to be a better recipe for publishing success than serving up despair. A Preface to Morals became an instant success and his first book chosen for the Book-of-the-Month Club. The Phantom Public, as noted earlier, disappeared after its first printing.

However, it was the Lippmann of Public Opinion who would prove prophetic over the next three-quarters of a century: journalism did turn to science. Why remains a question that must continue to be pursued, especially when we note that one of the key proponents of this turn, Lippmann, had serious second thoughts about the practice of science in general. Perhaps even more important, now as the turn to science begins to unravel, as the borders between fact and fiction, news and entertainment, news and advertising continue to blur, is the need to reexamine this historic moment for what insights it can provide for creating a new vision of democracy and for the role that a new press might play in that vision.

Where Lippmann feared the decline of factuality for the relativity it implied about the world, Dewey welcomed it for exactly that reason. The relativity of truth called attention to the problem of authority in determining what will be called the truth. Dewey was happy to be done with false gods, whether they were based on religion or scientism. The test of truth must be in its consequences for the people and judged by the people who experience those consequences. Science, as a way of knowing the world, is not separate from the world. Science is an outgrowth of the interests of the human community that produces it and therefore carries the imprint of those values in the knowledge it delivers. When science forgets, or obscures, its connection to community it becomes only detached reason, and potentially dangerous reason, at that.

Democracy is not just another innovation in government administration. Democracy is the ideal of community realized in practice. It is a constant experiment whose goal is to provide for the greatest development of individual men and women in relationship to the community.

For Dewey, we have always lived in the post-factual age, but have denied
it. Mistaking scientism as the ushering in of a new age of facts, of objectivity, was simply the latest form of denial. The consequences of this mistake were serious. Democracy was at stake. To pretend that science was some form of independent knowledge divorced from the interests or concerns of the peopled, established the conditions for the powerful to use science for their own interests. Public opinion could be engineered by playing down the “public” in the formation of that opinion.

Dewey presented a strong challenge to Lippmann and to a scientized understanding of the press, citizenship and democracy. This challenge was based on Dewey’s understanding of the interrelated character of epistemology, communication, and politics. However, where Lippmann’s scientistic view became the dominant perspective on the relationship between the press and democracy, Dewey’s view was marginalized. But the conflicts between scientism, news, and democracy that Dewey began to make visible have not gone away, but only continue to resurface in different forms. It is perhaps ironic, that the Deweyian idea of communication as both the means for inventing social reality and for constructing community are being wielded by advertisers in the service of fostering the consumption of goods rather than in the service of promoting and deepening democratic life. Efforts to recover Dewey simply as the patron saint of civic dialog are missing, intentionally or unintentionally.

For Dewey, we have always lived in the post-factual age, but have denied it. Mistaking scientism as the ushering in of a new age of facts, of objectivity, was simply the latest form of denial. The consequences of this mistake were serious. Democracy was at stake.

As social observers, communication theorists and critics struggle today with the problems of the press and the public, hopefully this new “return” to the Lippmann-Dewey encounter will help to place the “bias” critique of the press and public opinion into a more thoughtful juxtaposition to the “culture” critique.
End Notes

15. Ibid., p. 16.
16. Ibid., p. 28.
17. Ibid., p. 30.
18. Ibid., p. 30.
19. Ibid., p. 80.
20. Ibid., p. 81.
21. Ibid., p. 91.
22. Ibid., p. 193.
23. Ibid., p. 257.
24. Ibid., p. 257.
25. Ibid., p. 248.
26. Ibid., p. 204.
27. Ibid., p. 206.
28. Ibid., p. 207.
29. Ibid., p. 317.
30. Ibid., p. 319.
31. Ibid., p. 362.
32. Ibid., p. 330.
33. Ibid., p. 322.
34. Ibid., p. 333.
35. Ibid., p. 358.
36. Ibid., p. 344.
37. Ibid., p. 363.
38. Ibid., p. 310.
39. Ibid., p. 362.
40. Ibid., p. 365.
41. Ibid., p. 375.
42. Ibid., p. 396.
43. Ibid., p. 399.
45. Ibid., p. 277.
46. Ibid., p. 50.
47. Ibid., p. 107.
48. Ibid., p. 50.
49. Ibid., p. 49.
51. Ibid., p. 216.
52. Ibid., p. 216.
55. Ibid., p. 126.
56. Ibid., p. 162-163.
57. Ibid., p. 166.
58. Ibid., p. 167.
60. Ibid., p. 52.
61. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
62. Ibid., p. 54.
63. Ibid., p. 53.
64. Ibid., p. 53.
66. Ibid., p. 39.
67. Ibid., p. 77.
68. Ibid., p. 84.
60. Ibid., p.148.
62. This presentation of the basic argument of Quest for Certainty follows Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, p. 327.
63. Quoted in Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, p. 349.
66. Ibid., p.55.
67. Ibid., p.170.
70. Quoted in Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, p. 437.
72. Ibid., p. 174.
73. Quoted in Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, p. 337.
74. Quoted in Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, p. 365.
76. Quoted in Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy, p. 365.
78. Ibid., p. 177.
79. Ibid., p. 184.
88. Frazer, "Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation," in Unruly Practices:

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Meehan, Feminists Read Habermas; Marshall, Engendering Modernity; Craig Calhoun (ed), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992); Bruce Robbins, Phantom Public Sphere (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

Quoted in Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, p. 262.
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